

CLIMATE FINANCE AND CLIMATE JUSTICE

BEYOND COPENHAGEN



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CLIMATE FINANCE AND CLIMATE JUSTICE

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CLIMATE FINANCE AND CLIMATE JUSTICE

BEYOND COPENHAGEN



Why Focus on Climate Finance

The Beyond Copenhagen Coalition (BCPH), which came into being in early 2009, with the participation of 40 odd groups working on the climate change crisis issues and its various 'sectoral' areas in India, has been focusing right from the beginning on the issues of the tremendous adverse impacts of climate change on small holder poor farmers & farm workers, dry-land farming and the issue of Climate / Ecological Justice Tribunal. BCPH has, in regional, national and international fora, consistently raised these issues, through meetings, side events, publications, by holding public hearings of climate impacted communities etc. As the climate justice issue is central to our work including that for small-holder / peasant farmers, we are also looking into the issue of climate finance the idea, the promises, institutions involved, role of governments, space for people's voices & experiences etc. To redress the tremendous injustices of the rich-created climate change crisis, climate finance is a part of the justice mechanism envisaged.

Origin of Climate Finance

Ordinarily, the 'subjects' of climate & finance are from two different worlds. The understanding that “anthropogenic”, or more specifically certain types of economic & industrial pathway that some countries & societies have followed over particularly the last 100 years, is causing unpredictable and harmful changes to the global climate system, is the first connecting link. The second major link is the unjust yet true tragedy, which those countries & societies are suffering most from these harmful climatic aberrations, who have contributed almost nothing to the cause of the unfolding climate change crisis. In that sense, it's not right to call the present crisis “anthropogenic”, as the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) and almost all international players are naming it. As this is a result of a certain kind of Political-Economy, and has nothing to do with the existence of the human species (the 'anthropo' part), a more appropriate description would be “Industrial-capitalism induced” crisis. And this is in addition to the other major environmental, economical & social crises the same system is generating.

Out of these two primary linkages, through a process of somewhat 'coloured' and unequal process of international negotiations, the concept of and one time near universal consensus on climate finance emerged and was codified in the Kyoto Protocol, and the subsequent Bali Roadmap. The idea is that those who have contributed maximum to create this 'climate' change crisis,

will contribute 'financially' towards both the '*mitigation*' of the problem or crisis (depending upon who is describing it), and also to help the non-contributing victims of this crisis try & overcome at least the worst impacts from these climatic aberrations, or their '*adaptation*'. The financing is also supposed to help the poorer nations & societies to transition to a less carbon intensive 'development' path, as it was recognised that these societies need to get increased access to both more energy & other material services, to reach a minimum dignified level of existence. Thus, 'climate friendly technologies' for these poorer societies are to be part of the climate finance agenda, along with 'the adaptation finance needs of the most impacted'.

Climate Finance Wherefrom, To whom, How much, Mechanisms

The initial concept of generating climate finance was almost entirely from the 36 developed and richer countries in the Annex 1 list, who, have historically contributed maximum to create the climate change crisis in the first place. This they have managed to do by using overwhelmingly large shares of fossil carbon fuels, consuming disproportionately large shares of most material productions and by accumulating, often at the expense of poorer societies, all kinds of wealth through these uses. It was also agreed that the major part of the envisaged climate finance will come through 'public funding' by the rich countries, where the unequal market conditions are not a determinant. This was the near-universal consensus after Kyoto Protocol came into being and was being operationalised. Though under pressure from some developed & rich countries, the concept of generating climate finance from marketable CO2 emissions was also introduced in the formal design / mechanisms. These later became the primary 'sources', with public funding commitments wavering and not materializing in significant amounts.

It was also a near-consensus till the early part of the first decade of 21st century, that these financing will go to all the under-developed, under-consuming countries -- and those who are/likely to suffer the most from these erratic climatic changes -- to help them fight the impacts of climate change, to increase access & delivery of basic minimum needs through less carbon-intensive development pathways, and for the technologies & other means for this transition. There are many studies/research showing which countries & societies will suffer most from a range of climate catastrophes and the following World Bank study / grouping is one of these.

Six Climate Threats, and the 12 Countries Most at Risk

Low Income			Middle Income	
Drought	Flood	Storm	Coastal 1m	Agriculture
Malawi	Bangladesh	Philippines	All low-lying Island states	Sudan
Ethiopia	China	Bangladesh	Vietnam	Senegal
Zimbabwe	India	Madagascar	Egypt	Zimbabwe
India	Cambodia	Vietnam	Tunisia	Mali
Mozambique	Mozambique	Moldova	Indonesia	Zambia
Niger	Laos	Mongolia	Mauritania	Morocco
Mauritania	Pakistan	Haiti	China	Niger
Eritrea	Sri Lanka	Samoa	Mexico	India
Sudan	Thailand	Tonga	Myanmar	Malawi
Chad	Vietnam	China	Bangladesh	Algeria
Kenya	Benin	Honduras	Senegal	Ethiopia
Iran	Rwanda	Fiji	Libya	Pakistan

Source: World Bank.

The above table shows the 12 most vulnerable countries from a range of five (5) strong climate change impacts which are already evident &/or most likely to intensify soon. The one striking feature of this is that all *the most vulnerable countries are low or middle income, those who have not contributed to GHG-induced climate change to any significant degree. None of the richer countries, which caused this problem, are in the high-vulnerability list! Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable in three of these categories, as is India.*

It also has to be acknowledged that the number of people being & to be affected by a variety of climate risks have gone up sharply over the past 40 years or so, as shown by the figure below. This is no of people per lakh of population, and the figure has more than doubled in the last 40 years! This also shows that in spite of the Kyoto Protocol and various claims of nations & multilateral bodies like the World Bank, and their “market-driven climate solutions”, the problem has only worsened over the last decades. Obviously, these false-solutions are not working.

Also note the alarming percentage of world population being / likely to be affected by extreme climate events. Even this conservative estimate is close to 4% of the global population now, or nearly 280 million people, a number close to the total American population. The number being affected to a lesser degree is higher.

Figure 1: Global Climate Risk, 1970–2008: Probability of Being Affected by an Extreme Climate Event* (Per 100,000)



Somewhere down the line, starting midway in the last decade (2000-2009), several developed nations started raising the bogey of 'emerging economies' bearing part of the responsibility. This was clearly & knowingly ignoring the fact that none of the emerging economies including the wealthiest & the largest emitter, China has historical emissions anywhere even comparable to the rich nations. This was also a violation of the agreed Kyoto principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, based on respective capabilities, and the fact that the biggest of these emerging economies are still inhabited by a disproportionately large percentage of very poor people, who are at the front-line of climate impacts, as shown by the above figures.

The rich nations have stalled any meaningful climate financing, taking cover under these new excuses a clear case of continuous shifting of the goal-posts after the game began under agreed rules/norms. There is also increasing talks and proposals in the last two years starting from the UNFCCC-COP15 (15th Conference Of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) at Copenhagen onwards, that a major part of any climate finance will have to come from “market mechanisms”, and not public funding. This clearly neglects the fact that capitalist 'free' markets (strangely, free from regulatory controls, but not from public financial support as demonstrated during and after the start of the present economic downturn from late 2007) operate primarily not to take care of the needs of the poor, but to make maximum profit from those who can pay for the goods & services on offer, at

levels & terms to maximise the corporate profits.

The Cancun Agreement on Long-Term Cooperative Action (Decision 1/COP.16) in Dec.2010 to some extent consolidated the climate finance promises that were only vaguely given in the 2009 Dec. Copenhagen Accord in terms of the Fast-Start & Green Climate Funds. There are various estimates, guesses, guestimates and calculations that have gone into determining what range of climate finance needed would be needed for various critical elements of adaptation, transition etc. Starting with the highly publicized 2003 Stern Review, to the latest (2010) World Bank estimate, the amount of minimum climate finance needed has by now, some basis rather than random guesses. If the figures circulated around 2004 were about US \$200 billion per year for a comprehensive response to climate change crisis, it has come to a minimum of US \$500 billion (US \$1 billion roughly equals Indian Rs.5,000 Crores) per year in the latest World Bank report.

In the early stages of climate finance negotiations, the figure of about US \$200 billion per year to go to the poorer countries was being seriously discussed. It was also proposed that in view of the problems of immediate generation of such large financial resources, a 'fast-start' finance will be more "appropriate". Somewhere before the Copenhagen climate summit (COP15), this fast-track finance figure came down to the pathetic (remember, this finance is for the whole world of climate change impacted people!) US \$30 billion for the three years of 2010-2012, or US \$10 billion per year till 2012. This was to be followed by an amount of US \$100 billion per year from 2020! The year 2012 is significant as the first commitment period (for actions agreed under the Kyoto Protocol, including reduction of polluting Green House Gas emissions by the developed countries to the agreed level, and climate finance) under KP ends in 2012. There is as yet no certainty, no clear direction as to what happens to the international climate treaty & and positioning of big-nation players after December 2012. Neither has it been fully agreed what the second commitment period would be? What with increased reduction commitments and vastly increased climate finance needs & hopefully increased financing commitments. Though there are proposals that the second commitment period (if at all) be a short period of 2013-2017, as the climate system is running out of maneuvering space and is dangerously close to increased number of catastrophic events.

Consider the fact that the rich economies together just threw 'life-lines' to their biggest and richest banks, financial institutions and corporations

- amounting to over US \$3,000 billion of Public Funds in two years after the financial crisis hit them (the 'competition based free-market economy', so sacrosanct till now, just vanished in thin air, as the 'free-market' evangelists themselves got hit). Also consider the actual climate catastrophe induced losses suffered by just a poor medium-sized nation Pakistan in just one large climate change disaster -- the recent devastating floods -- conservatively estimated at US \$30 billion, just in one year! How the estimate of US \$200 billion/year in 2004 came down to US \$10 billion in 2010 (the actual down-grading is more than 20 times, considering inflation), what will happen from 2013 to 2019, how much US \$100 billion will be worth in 2004 value then, what happens to the World Bank estimate of a minimum of US \$500 billion /year?? None of these have any clear answers from those playing the geo-political-economical climate games. It is immeasurably bigger than even all the Olympic Games put together! This game not only involves vast amounts of money, it also involves huge losses of human lives and livelihoods, fast increasing species extinction, potential threat to the very existence of the majority of the world's poor. Thus, it has far more adrenalin-pumping excitement for the big players than even the now-rare big-game hunting!

Where will these climate funds come from? The original consensus of a large part of this being public funds, have many supporters and many mechanisms have been suggested for that. Selling or even auctioning of carbon dioxide emission permits within the developed countries is one such proposal (note that presently, the emission permits are distributed free to big-polluters, based on their present calculated emission figures). Carbon tax on all products & services which have large carbon footprints is another proposal (for example, air travel is a highly carbon-intensive mode of travel, which causes a large pollution contribution by fewer richer people, and a carbon-emission tax on this can generate substantial and well justified climate funds, in addition to braking the fast growth of this high-emission activity). A Tobin-tax, or tax on large financial transactions is another idea that is circulating for long. All are feasible, but none of these even touches the original idea of a small part of the GDP of the rich nations being committed as climate finance as their moral, ethical & legal commitments to those badly impacted by the consumption of these rich societies.

The two major climate finance routes that the world's governments have adopted are the funds transfer through the so-called Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which is an approved mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol,

and the forest related Reduction of Emission through Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) and the addition to this with Enhancement of forest carbon, or the REDD+ scheme, which are yet to be formally adopted though already operational in other ways. The CDM allows entities in the rich developed countries not to reduce their actual GHG pollution, and instead buy Carbon Credits from poorer developing country's activities which are supposed to be less GHG emitting than they otherwise would be, and "offset" their emissions with this saving of the developing country activity. Apart from these, the World Bank hosted CLIMATE INVESTMENT FUND (CIF) and FOREST CARBON PARTNERSHIP FACILITY (FCPF) are two of the climate financing mechanisms under operation, though their effectiveness is under question.

Box 1: Existing Climate Finance Institutions

Global Environment Facility (GEF): Interim financial mechanism of the UNFCCC; estd in 1994

Montreal Protocol Fund: Multilateral fund to eliminate ozone depleting substances; estd in 1990

Adaptation Fund: Adaptation financed by a 2% levy on Clean Development Mechanism transactions; estd in 2008, under Kyoto Protocol.

Forest Carbon Partnership Facility: World Bank carbon financing pilot for forest emissions; estd in 2007

Climate Investment Funds: World Bank and MDB pilot funds for clean technology deployment, adaptation, and forests; estd in 2008

-Clean Technology Fund: Finances clean technology deployment that significantly reduces GHGs.

-Pilot Program on Climate Resilience: Funding for adaptation to climate change.

-Forest Investment Program: Financing to address the role of forests in climate change.

Brazil Amazon Fund: Brazilian National Development Bank fund to reduce deforestation; estd in 2008

Bangladesh Multi-Donor Trust Fund: National, World Bank-administered climate change fund; estd in 2008

Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund: Planning Ministry (Bappenas) fund administered by UNDP; estd in 2009

The very concept of CDM is flawed and full of fraudulent actions. The only beneficiaries are the rich corporations in these developing countries, as they are the ones with the resources to go through the complicated international process, and most of the CDM projects Chinese & Indian corporates being the largest beneficiaries have only increased the sufferings of the poorer communities around these project sites, who are supposed to be lead to a “sustainable development path” by these CDM activities. This is apart from the fact that CDMs have neither reduced the GHG emission of the buyer or seller countries, nor of the world as a whole. And recently, the CDM Executive Board has rejected several Chinese proposals of Wind Energy Farms a very clearly climate friendly pathway on flimsy grounds of 'additionality', while admitting the very polluting coal fired power plants application for CDM money as they are using the so-called 'super-critical steam' technology. The wind energy farms will have hardly any GHG pollution, while the super-critical steam coal power plants will add multiple millions of tons of CO2 each, every year. These are the strange logics of today's climate finance mechanisms.

The other major climate finance mechanism in operation today, REDD /REDD+ , is the concept that poorer developing countries with substantial forest cover are cutting down their rich forests for economic development, and need to be financially helped to preserve & even enhance their forests. The dependence on forests for economic growth need to be diverted with investments on their basic survival needs being supplied from non-forest activities. This has the logic that forests are some of the best carbon sinks, and soak up carbon dioxide at a far lower price per ton of CO2 than many other emission reduction activities, and thus with the same climate financing you can get more bang for the buck. This also follows the 'least-cost' logic that increasing forests in the developed countries is costlier though these countries often have far lower population densities and large tracts of land.

Hard cash talks much louder than soft human lives if they are poor, and that's why there is hardly any considerations that a fairly large number of the world's poorest people live in or around the forests, that they are largely dependent on forest resources for their livelihoods, that forests are also the habitats of a very large part of the world's bio-diversity, and any attempt to look at forests through the lens of Forest Carbon-Stock, is most likely to seriously impact all these humans and other lives. The considerations of various human rights of people who live inside or in the periphery of forests, the multiple importance of the diversity of plants & animals in a forest, rather than how

much carbon can be stored in a certain amount of tree-covered area etc are thorny questions yet to be answered, and impacting this route of climate finance, though these have not deterred either the rich-country entities or even the poor-country governments from going full steam ahead with REDD / REDD+. Money talks louder than humans in these games.

There are other 'innovative' proposals for climate finance, some of which have generated considerable international interest. The Equadorian governments proposal of not drilling for and extracting its huge petroleum (a GHG emitting fossil fuel) reserve under the dense Amazonian forest of Yasuni region, if the rich nations pay Equador the climate finance in exchange of this non-extraction & burning of a polluting fuel -- has attracted several countries. Some European countries, lead by Germany, has committed substantial climate funds for this "Yasuni Green Gold" proposal. There are other ideas, but all are now being diluted in light of the dithering of the richer nations in face of their economic turmoil and their clear reluctance to honour the commitments.

While many of these are being discussed and even "agreed upon", the actual flow of climate finance to the distressed poorest countries & societies have been much lower than the noises made. It is estimated that of major public funds dedicated to climate change, only 7.45 per cent of disbursements to date have been for adaptation, 83.19 per cent for mitigation, 4.86 per cent for REDD+ related mitigation, and 4.5 per cent multiple foci (as on October 2010). Early indications are that lack of attention to adaptation looks set to continue for Fast-Start finance. In recent years, the 49 poorest countries have received one-eighth of the climate funding from the Global Environment Facility, while about one-third has gone to just three countries (China, India and Brazil). Only \$220m has been pledged to fund adaptation plans in the Least Developed Countries, a fraction of the \$2b estimated total costs.

(Source: Righting Two Wrongs Oxfam Briefing Note).

Governance & Transparency Issues

The poor nations have waited and waited for any kind of Climate Finance, facing one devastation after another, and wondered about how the estimated (much much less is actually committed) climate finance figures kept shrinking, without being actually privy to the negotiating games. This was brought to the fore, when in Dec.2009 at the COP15, a "selected" few nations (big emerging economies were part of that coterie lead by the US & Denmark) sat together behind closed doors violating the UN negotiating principles of every country as

equal consulting partner and came out with the atrocious “Copenhagen Accord”, effectively throwing many accepted KP decisions to the garbage bin. Several poor countries protested this secrecy & unilateralism, but many folded up to the pressures of coercion or little financial temptations. Bolivia was the noted exception and stood up for all the marginalized societies. In terms of compliance of KP, the “Cancun Agreement” of the COP16 at Mexico in Dec.2010 only took this process of non-transparency and de-collectivization of governance and delegitimation of signed treaty -- further down the unethical might-is-right road. Though Cancun also saw the creation of the “Green Climate Fund” now being discussed and the Cancun LCA text also included a decision to establish a Standing Committee on finance to assist the COP on matters relating to financial mechanism, and to improve reporting by developed countries on their provision of finance to developing countries. This was one right step towards accountable governance.

When even official “Parties” the national governments to the UNFCCC & KP are not always privy to decision making and goal-post shifting, one can easily imagine the status of the civil society which often is the only representative voice of the marginalised. Apart from this, even the decisions that our own national governments are taking, or their commitments to international fora or secret chambers of powerful nations (like the G-20), are hardly ever open to scrutiny to our own Parliaments. Within South-Asia, the Indian government has drastically changed its position on mitigation, on climate finance etc without in any way taking its people, or even its own Parliament into confidence. Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world, from several continuing and expected climate change impacts, and yet it failed to stand firm in Copenhagen & Cancun on the principles of climate justice. Nepal has a large percentage of its people deeply dependent on forest resources, and yet it has initiated REDD+ projects in its territory, in return of some money from a few European countries. It is no surprise that the large number of poor people in India or in Bangladesh or in Nepal, who are already suffering from climate impacts, have no information or knowledge of their own government's stands or changes of positions, and that their lives & livelihoods are up for garage-sales.

Whatever climate finance is actually committed and operationalised, it is facing and will continue to face the big question of credibility as the World Bank has been made the trustee of the fast-track finance for the first three years till 2012, and the WB has no admirable record of looking after the poor societies, rather the opposite. There is the newly constituted “Green Climate

Fund” with a governing board split numerically equally between developed & developing countries, but who and how this fund will be governed, is yet being negotiated. In the meantime, big businesses are already establishing their stranglehold over many of the processes by floating many pressure groups on governments & by floating BINGOs (Business and Industry NGO) to influence the little bit of open-space that occasionally comes up for civil society organizations and people's movements, during the negotiations.

BOX 2: Some key principles in climate finance (IBON Primer)

Climate finance must be adequate and equitable compensation.

Climate finance must be democratically governed. International climate funds should ideally have mandate from the UNFCCC and come under the full authority of the COP.

Climate finance must be human rights-based. Climate finance funding decisions and processes of delivery must also be consistent with human rights principles.

Climate finance must be country-led and democratically owned.

Climate action is integral to overall development.

World Bank's role in climate finance

In July 2008 the World Bank Board of Directors approved the creation of two climate investment funds Climate Investment Funds (CIF) and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) whose purpose is to provide interim, scaled-up financing to developing countries to integrate climate change considerations in their programs.

CIF comprise the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF). The International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) of the World Bank Group serves as the Trustee for the CIF. In its capacity as Trustee, IBRD established both the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and Strategic Climate Fund (SCF) Trust Funds to receive donor contributions. It holds in trust, as a legal owner and administrator, the funds, assets and receipts that constitute the Trust Fund, pursuant to the terms

entered into with the contributors.

According to the Bank, CTF will provide new, large-scale financial resources to invest in projects and programs in developing countries which contribute to the demonstration, deployment, and transfer of low-carbon technologies. The projects or programs must have a significant potential for long-term greenhouse gas savings.

STF will be broader and more flexible in scope and will serve as an overarching fund for various programs to test innovative approaches to climate change. The first such program is aimed at increasing climate resilience in developing countries.

FCPF is designed to assist developing countries to reduce emissions from deforestation and land degradation (REDD). The facility aims to build capacity for REDD in developing countries and tests a program of performance-based incentive payments in pilot countries on a small scale. The results and lessons would then be incorporated into a larger incentive payment system.

It is claimed that “in designing the funds, participants have taken care to recognize the primacy of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in global climate negotiations, and to support those negotiations. All funds and programs under the CIF have a sunset clause in order not to prejudice on-going UNFCCC deliberations regarding the future of the climate change regime”.

To broadly put climate finance in a framework, one can see two parallel structures emerging with the sources of funding remaining limited to the same donor countries. Also, the WB has become the stronger contender for the funds amounting US \$6 billion for climate change adaptation. Further, the sunset clause is also not workable and in no way ensures that the Bank is withdrawing from the climate finance which is already proving to be a major success for them.

Concerns over Banks involvement in climate funds

The Bank has been time and again criticized by CSOs for its role to undermine the UNFCCC process and create market based solutions to climate change impacts. The underdeveloped and the developing nations have still not supported the process of creating a parallel structure in the absence of UNFCCC structure. There has been persistent opinion from the third world to let UNFCCC be the guardian of the climate funds over World Bank.

Critics warn about Bank's controversial history of being an opportunist in market capturing. Climate change is the new package through which the Bank is reinventing itself. The current investment of the Bank is possibly around US \$ 6 billion in the carbon market. It is impossible that the Bank would not tap on the lucrative market especially with the sunset clause having no binding influence, there seems to be a clear understanding in terms of not leaving the ongoing projects.

Continued insistence for channeling finances through the World Bank reflects rich countries' desire to maintain the status quo of the global financial architecture for delivering climate finance. This in long term would also mean that the carbon finance market could be rooted through the Bank and there will be major road blocks for creating a neutral mechanism for climate finance globally.

The challenges are not only about which country or country grouping, which institutions etc will be ultimately governing the climate finance and through what mechanisms, but the bigger challenge is how to bring in the voices of the poor, of those communities already paying the price of reckless fiddling with nature's climate system. How do we ensure that the world's Carbon-Keeper -- those who practice a low carbon life-style, and protect forests or grow our foods through low-impact agriculture are given the benefit of these climate finance ? And these cannot be achieved by just giving a little space for voicing their concerns (in any case, not many true representatives of these communities are able to reach the high tables of the negotiators & parties to the negotiations). For true democratic governance and transparent operation of climate finance, these communities have to be brought to the centre of the climate finance decision making. The climate finance however little and whatever little will finally flow to the developing country governments, but how or whether they will reach the true climate impacted communities in real need based & transparent manner, is not clear.

These are the many questions in the vexed issue of climate finance. How to resolve them in a just and equitable way? That is the 500 billion dollar question.

Comments and Feedback welcome at: (soumyadutta_delhi@rediffmail.com)

Publications by BCPH

- Compilation of Testimonies on the Impact of Climate Change (Hindi, 2009)
- “Akele nahin aata aakal” (Droughts do not happen in isolation) (Hindi, 2009)
- Verdict of the Public Hearing: “Climate Change: Voices from the Rain-fed Areas” (English, 2009)
- “Jalvaayu Parivartan aur Bharat” (Climate Change and India) (Hindi, 2009)
- People's Declaration on Climate Change (English, 2009)
- The Incomplete Idiot's Guide to COP 15 (English, 2009)
- People's Report on “Status of Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security and Community Resilience in India” (Hindi and English 2009)
- Dictionary on Climate Change (English, 2009)
- Documentation of Traditional Early Warning Systems and Weather Forecasting (English, 2009)
- Beyond Copenhagen: A Collective Action against Climate Change (English, 2009)
- Why Agriculture must be a focus in Climate Change Negotiations: COP15 Side Event (English, 2009)
- Legal Approach Paper on State and Non- State Liability and Compensation for Climate Change Impacts (English, 2010)
- Compilation of Testimonies for the National Peoples Tribunal on Climate Crisis (English and Hindi, 2010)
- Agriculture and Food Security in Climate Change (English and Hindi, 2010)
- Primer on Climate Change (English, 2010)
- Verdict: National Peoples Tribunal on Climate Crisis (English, 2010)
- Critical Issues of Climate Change and Climate Governance (English, 2010)
- Much Ado about State Action plan on Climate Change; Its business as usual for the Govts. (Occasional Paper Series, English, 2010)
- Agriculture in Climate Change negotiations (Occasional Paper Series, English, 2011)
- International Negotiations on Climate Change; Global outlook towards road to Durban (Occasional Paper Series, English, 2011)
- Climate Change in India and State Response (Occasional Paper Series, English, 2011)



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Beyond Copenhagen Collective (BCPH) is a coalition of more than 40 organizations and networks working on the issues of sustainable development, environment, sustainable agriculture etc. We have been extensively engaged with India's response to Climate Crisis, Domestic Action and its position in International negotiation process under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. We have tried to attract global attention on due consideration of agriculture and food security in climate change negotiations, state responsibility and accountability for climate justice.

Organizations and networks part of the BCPH collective bring with them varying experiences and expertise, ranging from grassroots works with farmers and peasant communities to engaging with policy makers and the polity through policy analysis, advocacy and lobbying, engaging with the media through their sensitization and orientation; and undertaking documentation and scientific exploration in climate change, sustainable agriculture and food security. The focus of our work emanates from the understanding that there is an urgency to work in collaborative action on climate change and climate justice issues. The collective proposes to address these issues through a variety of actions at local, state/provincial, national and global level.

Partners in the Beyond Copenhagen Collective

Accion Fraterna, Andhra Pradesh
Arthik Anusandhan Kendra, Uttar Pradesh
ASHA, Madhya Pradesh
Bej Bachao Andolan, Uttarakhand
Bharat Jan Vgyana Jatta, Delhi
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